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New Public-Key Cryptosystem Based on the Morphism of
Polynomials Problem
Houzhen Wang, Huanguo Zhang, Shaowu Mao, Wanqing Wu, and Liqiang Zhang
Abstract: During the last two decades, there has been intensive and fast development in Multivariate Public Key
Cryptography (MPKC), which is considered to be an important candidate for post-quantum cryptography. However,
it is universally regarded as a difficult task, as in the Knapsack cryptosystems, to design a secure MPKC scheme
(especially an encryption scheme) employing the existing trapdoor construction. In this paper, we propose a
new key-exchange scheme and an MPKC scheme based on the Morphism of Polynomials (MP) problem. The
security of the proposed schemes is provably reducible to the conjectured intractability of a new difficult problem,
namely the Decisional Multivariate Diffie-Hellman (DMDH) problem derived from the MP problem. The proposed
key agreement is one of several non-number-theory-based protocols, and is a candidate for use in the post-quantum
era. More importantly, by slightly modifying the protocol, we offer an original approach to designing a secure MPKC
scheme. Furthermore, the proposed encryption scheme achieves a good tradeoff between security and efficiency,
and seems competitive with traditional MPKC schemes.
Key words: public key cryptosystem; key exchange; Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC); Morphism of
Polynomials (MP) problem

1

Introduction

Public Key Cryptosystems (PKC) have fundamentally
changed our modern communication systems and
become an important tool for information society. This
revolutionary idea was firstly introduced by Diffie and
Hellman in their landmark paper, “New directions
in cryptography”, in 1976[1] . The Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol allows two entities to establish
a shared secret key via a public communication
channel. This common secret key is subsequently
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applied to carry out a variety of cryptographic purposes
such as efficient symmetric encryption and entity
authentication. In the past 30 years, the basic DiffieHellman protocol has been considered to be one of the
most practical cryptographic primitives, and has been
studied extensively. Some improved protocols, such as
the MQV protocol[2, 3] , have become the international
standards and been widely applied to many fields in the
real world, including the Internet and e-commerce.
Since the advent of the Diffie-Hellman protocol,
many PKC schemes have been proposed and
subsequently broken. Most of the successful PKCs are
based on number theory. For example, the difficulty
of factorization of an integer with large prime factors
led to the RSA scheme and its variants. Also the
difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem generated
the Diffie-Hellman like schemes such as ElGamal and
ECC.
Motivation. These public key schemes are widely
used, but have two obvious drawbacks. The first
comes from the challenge of rapid development
of quantum computing. In 1997, Shor[4] proposed
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quantum polynomial-time algorithms for factoring
integers and computing discrete logarithms. This means
that once a sufficiently powerful quantum computer
is built, the most widely used public key schemes,
including RSA, ElGamal, ECC, and their corresponding
key agreement protocols, will no longer be secure. The
second drawback is that these number-theory-based
schemes are not suitable for application in small
computing devices, such as low-cost smart cards and
active RFID tags, with limited computing capacity.
Hence it is of great interest and importance to
construct non-number-theory-based, faster, and secure
key exchange protocols and PKCs.
Related work. In recent years, the research on
post-quantum cryptography[5] has received a lot of
attention, with its main object to find alternative PKCs
against the quantum computing attack. Multivariate
Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) is considered to be a
competitive candidate for post-quantum cryptography.
Meanwhile it is well known that MPKC schemes are
in general much more computationally efficient than
number-theory-based PKC’s[6] . Most existing MPKC
schemes are based on the MQ problem and the
Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) problem, which
will be introduced in Section 2. The MQ problem
is NP-hard[7, 8] . It is worth mentioning that we can
obtain some excellent cryptographic schemes by using
the difficulty of the MQ problem directly, e.g., a
stream cipher scheme[9] , a hash function[10] , and a
public key identification scheme[11] . Up to now, we
have not known whether the IP problem is an NPhard problem. Also many IP-based cryptosystems,
including SFLASH, HFE, TTM, and some of their
variants[6, 12–16] , have been broken, because the special
structure of the central function made the corresponding
IP problem no longer random. Although there are
several MPKC proposals that are not considered to be
broken yet (HFE and UOV[17] , for instance), like the
Knapsack cryptosystems, it is generally regarded as
a difficult problem to design a secure MPKC scheme
(especially encryption scheme) employing existing
trapdoor construction.
Some efforts have been also made to construct
alternative secure key exchange protocols that are not
based on number theory. The results, however, are far
from encouraging. In 1999, Anshel et al.[18] proposed
a key agreement based on non-Abelian groups, and
subsequently presented a variant using the braid
group[19] ; these two protocols were broken in Refs. [20,
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21]. Similarly, a key agreement based on the braid group
was proposed by Ko et al.[22] and proved to be insecure
in Refs. [20, 23]. Boucher et al.[24] proposed a new
key exchange and encryption scheme based on the socalled non-commutative skew polynomials, whereafter,
an efficient attack was discovered by Dubois and
Kammerer[25] . The other systems that are worth
mentioning are the quantum-key agreement protocols
proposed by Bennet and Brassard[26, 27] . However, from
our perspective, these quantum protocols are still highcost, and can hardly achieve the protocols without a
classical channel. Indeed one of our aims is to construct
a faster secure key-exchange protocol based on a nonnumber-theory problem.
Main contributions. We propose a Diffie-Hellmanlike key-exchange scheme and an MPKC scheme
employing a Morphism of Polynomials (MP) problem.
Our proposed schemes have the following features.
(1) The key-exchange protocol is based on a variant
of the MP problem similar to the Diffie-Hellman
problem, which also proved to be secure in
the presence of an eavesdropper. We propose
practical-sized parameters which provide 14 400
bits of exchanged information, with a complexity
of roughly 224 binary operations for performing
the protocol. Our encryption scheme is constructed
from this protocol, and bears some similarity to
the ElGamal scheme.
(2) The MPKC encryption scheme is nondeterministic and has also proved to be CPA-secure
like ElGamal. For each session, the ciphertext
relies on both of the corresponding plaintexts and
an MQ function chosen at random in the shared
key space.
(3) We propose a truly original approach to designing
the secure MPKC scheme in the construction
of our encryption scheme. Moreover, the key
exchange protocol and encryption scheme are
also considered to be a promising candidate for
post-quantum era.
Paper organization. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
several notations and new difficulty assumptions, which
will be used in our constructions. In Section 3 we
propose a Diffie-Hellman-type key-exchange protocol
and a new MPKC scheme. Section 4 is dedicated to
a simple security proof and security evaluation against
several possible attack methods. In Section 5 we give
the theoretical operating characteristics of our schemes
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and a practical-sized instance. Finally, we conclude our
work and suggest possible improvements in Section 6.

2

Preliminaries

The notations used throughout this paper are as follows.
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements, Mn .Fq / be a
set of n  n matrices whose components are in Fq , and
let In be an nn identity matrix. For any set S , a 2R S
denotes that a is uniformly and randomly selected from
S , and for s 2 S , we write PrŒa D s to denote the
probability that any a is equal to s. As usual, x D
.x1 ; : : : ; xn / represents an n-dimensional row vector.
2.1

Multivariate quadratic systems and related
problems

Definition
Definition1 1(The
(The MQ
MQ Function)
Function) We
We denote
denote by
.n;m;
m;FFqq// aa family
family of multivariate quadratic
MQ.n;
functions,
F.x/ D .f1 .x/; : : : ; fm .x//;
Xn
Xn
fi .x/ D
˛i;j;k xj xk C
ˇi;j xj C i ;
j 6k

j

where ˛i;j;k ; ˇi;j ; i 2 Fq for i D 1; : : : ; m.
Given an instance F2R
.n; m; Fq / and a vector
m
y0 2 Fq , the so-called MQ problem is to find a solution
x0 2 Fnq such that F.x0 / D y0 . The MQ problem is
well known to be an NP-hard problem, even when
restricted to quadratic equations over F2 [7] and over
any finite field[8] . Some cryptographic schemes can be
constructed only from this problem such as Refs. [9,
11].
The security of existing MPKC schemes relies not
only on the MQ problem but also on an IP problem
defined as follows:
Definition 2 (IP Problem) Given any F and G in
.n; m; Fq /, find, if any, a pair of invertible affine
transformations .T; U/ such that
GDTıFıU
(1)
where “ı” denotes the composition of functions.
The general method of building an MPKC scheme
is to construct an invertible MQ function F, called a
central function, and then hide this central function by
employing two invertible affine transformations T and
U. The composition T ı F ı U will be used as a public
key and the pair .T; U/ is considered to be a secret key.
That is, the IP problem is usually used for an embedded
trapdoor.
The IP problem originated by trying to recovering
the secret keys for an MPKC scheme (such as the C
scheme[28] ), and IP cryptosystems were first introduced

by Patarin[29] . During the blossom of MPKCs, many
IP-based cryptosystems were proposed, including the
SFLASH scheme, the HFE scheme, the OV scheme, the
TTM scheme, and some of their variants (see Ref. [6]).
Nevertheless, most of these schemes have been broken,
because the special structure of the central function
made the corresponding IP problem no longer random.
More efforts were devoted to this direction, e.g.,
Refs. [30–34], but so far no polynomial time algorithms
that attack the general IP problem are known.
In this paper, we propose a new key exchange
protocol and public key encryption scheme based on
a more general IP-type problem that is when affine
transformations T and U as in Eq. (1) are not necessary
bijective; this is called an MP problem. This problem
has been proven to be NP-hard for any finite field by
Patarin et al.[35] Thus Patarin et al. advised designing
cryptographic schemes using the MP problem, but
meanwhile they also think that this very general
construction is not very practical, and it may be more
difficult to design cryptographic algorithms from MP
than from IP.
In addition, it is the linear variant of IP-type that is
usually used in practice. More precisely, the T and U in
Definition 2 are both linear transformations. Faugère
and Perret[33] pointed out that any method solving a
variant of IP can be easily transformed into a method
solving IP. For the case of MP, according to the results
in Ref. [35], a linear variant of an MP problem is still
hard. Thus in the rest of the paper, we substitute affine
transformations for linear ones. That is to say, T and U
like Eq. (1) will be both seen as square matrices over
Fq .
2.2

Proposed difficult problems

Our proposed cryptographic hardness assumptions are
based on the following result.
Theorem 1 Let f .T/ D an Tn C an 1 Tn 1 C    C
a1 T C a0 In and
KT D ff .T/ j8 T 2 Mn .Fq /; ai 2 Fq ; 0 6 i 6 ng:
Let jKT j denote the number of elements of the set KT
and d be the degree of the minimal polynomial m.x/ of
matrix T, then:
(1) for any two elements Ta and Tb in KT , Ta and Tb
satisfy the multiplication commutative law, that is
Ta Tb D Tb Ta ;
(2) jKT j D q d .
Proof The proof of (1) follows immediately from
the properties of a matrix polynomial. As to (2), note
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that since m.T/ D 0, the matrix polynomial f .T/ can
be changed into a matrix polynomial with the degree
less than or equal to d 1. We can define by
f .T/ D ad0 1 Td 1 C ad0 2 Td 2 C    C a10 T C a00 In ;
where each ai0 can be viewed as a function with respect
to a0 ; a1 ; : : : ; an .
Let us now prove uniqueness. Assume that
f .1/ .T/ D ad.1/ 1 Td 1 Cad.1/ 2 Td 2 C  Ca1.1/ TCa0.1/ In
and
f .2/ .T/ D ad.2/ 1 Td

1

Cad.2/ 2 Td

2

C  Ca1.2/ TCa0.2/ In ;

where ai.1/ , ai.2/ 2R Fq , 0 6 i 6 d
If f

.1/

.T/ D f

g.T/ D f .1/ .T/

1.

.2/

.T/, then we have
d
X1 .1/
f .2/ .T/ D
.ai

ai.2/ /Ti D 0;

i D0

where T0 D In .
It is clear that g.x/ is an annihilating polynomial
of matrix T and must satisfy m.x/jg.x/. The degree
of both polynomials meets deg.m.x// > deg.g.x//.
We conclude that the condition m.x/jg.x/ holds
if and only if g.x/  0; that is, ai.1/ D ai.2/ for
0 6 i 6 d 1. In other words, any matrix T0 2 KT
can be uniquely expressed by a d -dimensional vector
.a00 ; a10 ; : : : ; ad0 1 /. Furthermore, the d -dimensional
vector .a00 ; a10 ; : : : ; ad0 1 / 2 Fdq has q d possible values.
Thus we have jKT j D q d .

Note that the matrix T is called a seed matrix, and
the corresponding KT is a key space in the above
Theorem. We will show in Section 3 that the key space
of our proposed cryptographic scheme is KT [ KU ,
which is generated by two singular seed matrices T 2R
Mm .Fq / and U 2R Mn .Fq /. Now we assume that
Gx D Tx ı F ı Ux ;
Gy D Ty ı F ı Uy ;
Gxy D Tx Ty ı F ı Ux Uy
(2)
.n; m; Fq /, Tx ; Ty 2R KT , and Ux ;
where F2R
Uy 2R KU .
In addition, we denote the shared key space in Section
3.1 by
D fTz ı F ı Uz j Tz 2 KT and Uz 2 KU g (3)
and let Gz be a random MQ function in
that can
be obtained by Gz D Tz ı F ı Uz for Tz 2R KT and
Uz 2R KU .
The security of our key exchange protocol and
PKC scheme involves the difficulty of the following
problems.
(1) The Computational Multivariate Diffie-Hellman
(CMDH) problem:
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Instance: Given a triple .F; Gx ; Gy /,
Objective: Find the MQ function Gxy such that
Gxy D Tx Ty ı F ı Ux Uy as in Eq. (2).
(2) The Decisional Multivariate Diffie-Hellman
(DMDH) problem:
Instance: Given a 4-tuple .F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz /,
Objective: Decide whether Gz D Gxy as in Eq. (2).
The relationship among these problems, including the
MP problem, is similar to the case of the CDH problem,
the DDH problem, and the DL problem. That is, we
do not know whether CMDH and DMDH belong to an
NP-type problem. From the security proof in Section
4, our proposed schemes can achieve the expected
security level based on the premise that MP and DMDH
are computationally hard. That is the following two
hardness assumptions:
Definition 3 (MP Assumption) For all Probabilistic
Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithms A, there exists a
negligible function negl such that
PrŒA.F; Gx / D .Tx ; Ux / 6 negl./;
where  denotes a security parameter.
Definition 4 (DMDH Assumption) We say that a
DMDH problem is hard if for all PPT algorithms A,
there exists a negligible function negl such that
jPrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz / D 1
PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gxy / D 1j 6 negl./;
where  denotes a security parameter.

3

Cryptosystem Using an MP Problem

In this section, we propose a key-exchange agreement
and a PKC scheme based on the MP problem and the
CMDH problem.
3.1

Key-exchange protocol

Let G be a PPT algorithm that, upon input of a security
parameter 1 , outputs a 4-tuple .Fq ; T; U; F/, where
F 2R
.n; m; Fq /, and two singular matrices T 2R
Mm .Fq / and U2R Mn .Fq / of which the degrees of
the minimal polynomials are attained in m and n,
respectively. Now we describe a Diffie-Hellman-like
key agreement protocol between Alice and Bob as
follows:
(1) Alice runs G .1 / to obtain .Fq ; T; U; F/.
(2) Alice chooses Ta 2 KT and Ua 2 KU at random
and computes Ga D Ta ı F ı Ua .
(3) Alice sends .Fq ; T; U; F; Ga / to Bob.
(4) Bob receives .Fq ; T; U; F; Ga /. He chooses Tb 2
KT and Ub 2 KU at random and computes Gb D
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Tb ı F ı Ub . Bob sends Gb to Alice and computes
the shared key kB WD Gab D Tb ı Ga ı Ub .
(5) Alice receives Gb and computes the shared key
kA WD Gba D Ta ı Gb ı Ua .
Proof of correctness: By Theorem 1, Ta and Tb
commute (resp. Ua and Ub ), Thus we have Gba D Ta ı
Gb ıUa D Ta ı.Tb ıFıUb /ıUa D Ta ıTb ıFıUb ıUa D
Tb ı .Ta ı F ı Ua / ı Ub D Tb ı Ga ı Ub D Gab .
Consequently, Alice and Bob successfully establish a
common session key sk D kA D kB , which is an MQ
function in
.n; m; Fq /.
Remark 1. In the above protocol, we assume that
Alice generates .Fq ; T; U; F/ and sends it to Bob as
her first message. In fact, .Fq ; T; U; F/, as the system
parameter, can also be publicly known by two parties.
Thus Alice only needs to send Ga , and Bob needs
not wait for Alice’s message Ga before computing and
sending Gb .
3.2

Public key encryption scheme

Let H W
! f0; 1g` be an ideal hash function from a
shared key space like Eq. (3) to the message space. By
employing the key-exchange protocol in Section 3.1, we
construct a new MPKC scheme as follows:
(1) Key generation:
(a) Alice runs G .1 / to obtain .Fq ; T; U; F/.
(b) Alice chooses Ta 2 KT and Ua 2 KU at random,
and computes Ga D Ta ı F ı Ua .
(c) Public key is Ga and private key is .Ta ; Ua /.
(2) Encryption: Bob uses Alice’s public key Ga to
encrypt a message M 2 f0; 1g` .
(a) Bob chooses Tk 2 KT and Uk 2 KU at random
and computes Gak D Tk ı Ga ı Uk .
(b) Bob computes Gk D Tk ı F ı Uk and C D M ˚
H.Gak /.
(c) Ciphertext is .Gk ; C/.
(3) Decryption: Alice uses the private key .Ta ; Ua /
to decrypt the ciphertext .Gk ; C/.
(a) Alice uses .Ta ; Ua / to compute Gka D Ta ıGk ıUa .
(b) Then Alice computes M D C ˚ H.Gka /.
It is not hard to see that the encryption scheme is
correct: Since Ta and Tk commute (respectively, Ua and
Uk ), Alice obtains Gka D Ta Tk ı F ı Uk Ua D Gak and

hence C ˚ H.Gka / D C ˚ H.Gak / D M ˚ H.Gak / ˚
H.Gak / D M.

4

Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed
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key-exchange protocol and encryption scheme.
4.1

Security proof

We next prove the security of our key agreement
protocol in the presence of an eavesdropper. The proof
method is similar to that of Katz and Lindell[36] . We
first give some formalization definitions. Let ˘ denote
a key-exchange protocol, A an adversary, and 
the security parameter. We define the following keyexchange experiment KEeav
A;˘ ./:
(1) Two parties holding the security parameter 1
execute protocol ˘ . This execution generates a
transcript trans including all the messages sent by
the parties, and a key k established by each of the
parties.
(2) A bit b
f0; 1g is chosen at random. If b D 0
then choose a bit string kO
f0; 1g uniformly at
random, and if b D 1 set kO WD k.
O and outputs a bit b 0 .
(3) A is given trans and k,
(4) We say that A succeeds if b 0 D b, and is denoted by
KEeav
A;˘ ./ D 1.
Note that A being given the trans implies that he (or
she) eavesdrops on the entire execution of the protocol.
We say that A breaks ˘ successfully if he (or she) can
correctly determine the key k and a completely random
O On the contrary, we conclude that ˘ is
bit string k.
secure if the adversary succeeds with probability that at
most negligibly greater than 1/2. That is the following
security definition:
Definition 5 A key exchange protocol ˘ is secure
in the presence of eavesdropping adversaries if for all
PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function
negl such that
1
C negl./:
PrŒKEeav
A;˘ ./ D 1 6
2
We especially emphasize that our following proof
is less rigorous. The main reason is that Definition 5
requires the output key to be indistinguishable from a
completely random bit string, but we are only able to
prove that the shared key established by two parties
is indistinguishable from a random element of
as

b

Eq. (3). For now, we let KEeav
A;˘ ./ denote a modified
experiment where if b D 0, the adversary A is given
kO
Gz instead of a random string, where Gz is chosen
uniformly at random in .
Let us now prove the security of the proposed
protocol under the DMDH assumption.
Theorem 2 Based on the DMDH assumption,
the proposed key exchange protocol is secure in the
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presence of an eavesdropper (with respect to the
modified experiment KEeav
A;˘ ./).
Proof Let A be a PPT adversary. Since PrŒb D
0 D PrŒb D 1 D 1=2, we can obtain the inequality
like Formula (4).
PrŒKEeav
A;˘ ./ D 1 D

b

b
bEeav;˘ ./ D 1 ^ b D 1C
PrŒK
bEeav;˘ ./ D 1 ^ b D 0 D
PrŒK
1
bEeav;˘ ./ D 1 j b D 1C
 PrŒK
2
1
bEeav;˘ ./ D 1 j b D 0 D
 PrŒK
A

A

A

A
2
1
 PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gxy / D 1C
2
1
 PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz / D 0 D
(4)
2
1
 PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gxy / D 1C
2
1
 .1 PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz / D 1/ D
2
1
1
C  .PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gxy / D 1
2
2
PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz / D 1/ 6
1
1
C  jPrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gxy / D 1
2
2
PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz / D 1j
Assume that the DMDH problem is hard. By
Definition 4, there exists a negligible function negl such
that
jPrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gz / D 1

PrŒA.F; Gx ; Gy ; Gxy / D 1j 6 negl./:
We conclude that

b

PrŒKEeav
A;˘ ./ D 1 6

1
1
C  negl./;
2
2

which completes the proof.

Like the relationship between the Diffie-Hellman
protocol and the ElGamal scheme, the new encryption
scheme directly derives from the the proposed keyexchange protocol. We already analyzed the security
of our proposed protocol. In fact, the new proposed
encryption scheme is also CPA-secure, just like
ElGamal, which will be stated in Theorem 3. Due to
the limitations of space, proof details are omitted. A
similar proof for the ElGamal encryption scheme can
be found in Ref. [36].
Theorem 3 Based on the DMDH assumption, the
proposed public-key encryption scheme is secure under
a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA).

4.2
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Possible attacks and complexity

The proposed schemes are similar to the Diffie-Hellman
protocol and the ElGamal scheme in design, and have
the following properties:
(1) Like the original Diffie-Hellman protocol, our
key-exchange protocol is also insecure against
active adversaries. In particular, it succumbs to
the well-known person-in-the-middle attack. The
reason comes from the lack of authentication of
the temporary exchange public keys. In fact, it
can be modified by digital signature or PKI-based
techniques. However, this is outside of the scope of
the paper.
(2) Our encryption schemes, like ElGamal, must use
a different ephemeral key .Tk ; Uk / 2 KT  KU for
every session. If the same key .Tk ; Uk / is used to
encrypt M1 and M2 whose corresponding ciphertexts
are .Gk ; C1 / and .Gk ; C2 /, then M2 can be easily
obtained from .Gk ; C1 ; C2 / because H.Gka / D
M1 ˚ C1 D M2 ˚ C2 .
(3) By Section 4.1, the problem of breaking our
schemes is equivalent to solving the MP problem and
the CMDH problem, as breaking the Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange scheme and the ElGamal scheme is
equivalent to solving DL and CDH.
We now look at two natural attacks to evaluate the
base problems: the MP problem and the proposed
CMDH problem.
The first attack is to directly find the private key pair
.Ta ; Ua / from Ga and .Tb ; Ub / from Gb for computing
Gab . We next consider how to recover .Ta ; Ua / from
m
n
X
X
Ga . Let Ta D
˛i Ti C ˛0 Im and Ua D
ˇi Ui C
i D1

i D1

ˇ0 In (In general, ˛0 and ˇ0 are equal to 0 in order to
assure that Ta and Ua are both singular, the same as T
and U). It is obvious that for any x 2 Fnq , we have
Ga .x/ Ta ı F ı Ua .x/  0
(5)
n
and can obtain the following q cubic equations with
respect to ˛1 ; : : : ; ˛m , ˇ1 ; : : : ; ˇn by substituting all x 2
Fnq into Eq. (5).
X .3/
X .1/
X .2/
ij k ˇj ˇk C
ij k t ˛j ˇk ˇ t C
ij k ˛j ˇk C
j;k;t

j;k

X
j

ij.4/ ˛j

C

X

j;k

ij.5/ ˇj

C

i.6/

D0

j

where 1 6 i 6 q n and all coefficients are in Fq .
Note that if one can choose
n.n C 1/
CmCn
N D mn2 C mn C
2

(6)
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linearly independent equations from Eq. (6), then
solving such an overdefined nonlinear system is easy
by linearization[37] , and the complexity is only O.N 6 /.
However, the construction of such linearly independent
equations is in essence an exhaustive search process,
and thus it is not feasible. In fact, since F and .Ta ; Tb /
are both chosen at random, the problem of finding
.Ta ; Ua / from Ga is viewed as a random instance of
the reduced MP problem. The only difference is that
the number of unknown variables of Eq. (6) is m C n;
but it is m2 C n2 for the general MP problem (to
the best of our knowledge, the complexity of the only
exhaustive search algorithm for solving this problem
2
is about O.q n /), and thus the expected complexity of
recovering the private key attack is O.q n /.
The second attack is to find equivalent keys. Note
that solutions to the MP problem are in fact not unique;
we say that .T; U/ and .T0 ; U0 / are equivalent keys of
the MP problem derived from F if
T ı F ı U D T0 ı F ı U0 :
From the point of view of an attacker, we can see
clearly that the first attack method is more difficult
than recovering equivalent keys. For such analogous
decompositions including product of polynomials and
matrices, it is fairly difficult to recover precisely the
corresponding unknown factors. Relatively speaking,
an equivalent keys attack is always more feasible.
Indeed, this is evidenced by the successful attack of
some pioneering schemes such as the braid DiffieHellman scheme[23] , SFLASH[34] , and NSP[25] .
Before discussing the equivalent key attack in the
proposed schemes, we first introduce an important
Lemma[38] as follows:
Lemma 1 Let the matrix A 2R Mn .Fq / be given.
Then the number of the solutions X of the equation
AX D XA satisfies
2
(1) NA .n; q/ D q n when A D 0 or In , otherwise
2
(2) q n 6 NA .n; q/ 6 q .n 1/ C1 .
The equivalent keys attack with our notations is that
if an attacker can find an equivalent key pair .T0a ; U0a /
such that Ga D T0a ı F ı U0a , and T0a and Tb commute
(respectively, U0a and Ub ), then he (or she) can compute
T0a ı Gb ı U0a DT0a ı .Tb ı F ı Ub / ı U0a D
Tb ı .T0a ı F ı U0a / ı Ub D

(7)

Tb ı Ga ı Ub D Gab
Let
be given and satisfy U0a Ub D Ub U0a . We know
that finding T0a such that
Ga .x/ T0a ı F ı U0a .x/ D 0
U0a

is very easy for enough x 2 Fnq if T0a exists. Clearly,
that if such T0a exists and commutes with Tb , then
the attacker succeeds. On the premise that T0a exists,
according to Eq. (7) and Lemma 1, the success
probability is
PrŒT0a jT0a Tb D Tb T0a  D

NTb .m; q/
q m2

6

q .m

1/2 C1

q m2

!0

(8)
2
where NTb .m; q/ 6 q .m 1/ C1 because the private key
Tb is not equal to 0 or In in practice.
The security of our proposed schemes is based
on the MP problem, only the exhaustive search
algorithm is known to solve MP. But the complexity
estimate provided for the IP problem is based on
the TF algorithm[35] , which is O.q n=2 / for the C 
scheme[28] , and O.q 3n=2 / for any central function in
.n; m; Fq /. Consequently, a conservative security
estimate of our proposed schemes is at least O.q n=2 /.
Remark 2. Compared with the existing MPKC
construction, the overriding advantage is that the central
map in our construction is not required to be invertible,
and thus can be chosen at random. There is also a
drawback in that the matrices of the two sides we
generated are not completely random in Mm .Fq / or
Mn .Fq /. That is to say, the security of our schemes
is based on the reduced MP problem, but which is
intractable like the above discussion.

5

Efficiency Analysis

In this section, we discuss the implementation details
of the proposed encryption scheme, including sizes and
implementation computation complexity.
Recall that the system parameter of our encryption
scheme is .Fq ; F; T; U/, where F 2R
.n; m; Fq /,
and two nonsingular matrices, T2R Mm .Fq / and
U 2R Mn .Fq /, of which the degree of the minimal
polynomial is attained in m and n, respectively. We
can denote the proposed encryption scheme by a triple
.Fq ; n; m/. The following discussions are about the
implementation details of our encryption scheme,
which is summarized in Table 1.
(1) The private key Ta can be generated by an
m-dimensional vector in Fm
q by Theorem 1, and
Ua by a corresponding n-dimensional vector in
Fnq . Thus in practical, the size of the private key
is only .m C n/ log q bits.
(2) The size of the public key Ga is at most
n.n C 3/m log q=2 bits.
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Table 1
Plaintext
Ciphertext
Private key
Public key
Encryption
Decryption
Security

The operating characteristics of our scheme.
.Fq ; n; m/
.F216 ; 12; 10/
.m C n/ log q bits
352 bits
n.n C 3/mq=2 C .m C n/ log q bits 14 752 bits
.m C n/ log q bits
352 bits
n.n C 3/m log q=2 bits
14 400 bits
O.mn4 /
162 878 Mulsa
4
O.mn /
132 120 Mulsa
n=2
O.q
/
296

Note: Mulsa denotes the number of multiplication operation over F216 .

(3) In order to obtain better security, we may set the
bit length ` of H.Gak / equal to .m C n/ log q,
and thus the message length is also .mCn/ log q.
That is equal to the size of the private key.
(4) Since the size of Gk is the same as that of Ga ,
the bit size of ciphertext .Gk ; C/ is equal to
n.n C 3/m log q=2 C .m C n/ log q.
(5) The implementation of the scheme only involves
in multiplication and addition in Fq . In comparison
with the cost of multiplication operations, addition
operations are considered negligible. Thus we
only compute multiplications in the following
analysis.
 The key generation step consists in the generation
of the matrices .Ta ; Tb / and the creation of the
MQ function Ga D Ta ı F ı Ua . We know that
the product of two n  n matrices requires n3
multiplications in the worse case (in fact, the best
known algorithm is O.nc /, where c ' 2:3755).
So the first part has a complexity of m4 C m C
n4 C n multiplications in Fq . The second part is


n.n C 1/
n.n C 3/m
.n C n2 /
C n2 m C
m:
2
2
Hence the overall complexity is O.mn4 /.
 The cost of the encryption step is the same as that
of the key generation process. The decryption
step only needs to construct the MQ function
Gka . Thus the complexity of these two steps is
also O.mn4 /.
Note that only .m C n/ log q bits are encrypted at
a time, which leads to the serious message expansion.
Table 1 shows that it is close to a multiple of 40 for the
proposed instance. Meanwhile, we know that publickey schemes are used essentially for identification and
key management; thus, the scheme still has certain
value in practice.
We propose a practical encryption scheme employing
.F216 ; 12; 10/. As shown in Table 1, the time
complexity of the best-known algorithms to break
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this instance is estimated to be more than 280 . The
encryption speed is about 218 multiplications in F216 ,
which is roughly estimated to be 224 binary operations.
And the corresponding decryption speed is roughly
223 . As for the key size, the proposed scheme is
greater than that of the ElGamal scheme. This is also
a common shortcoming of all MPKC schemes, but
compared with some classical MPKC schemes such
as the SFLASH signature standard[39] (which has been
fully broken[13, 34] ), the key size of the proposed scheme
is clearly smaller.

6

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper we propose a new key-exchange protocol
and a public-key cryptosystem based on the MP
problem. The security of these two schemes is provably
reducible to solving the base problem, the DMDH
problem. Meanwhile these schemes are also viewed as
a candidate for the post-quantum era with the quantum
computing security. More importantly, we offer an
original approach to design the MPKC scheme. Overall
our proposed schemes achieve a good tradeoff between
security, efficiency, and key size, and seem to be
competitive with existing approaches.
As a further study, some possible improvements of
our cryptographic schemes are:
(1) This paper introduces two new difficult problems,
CMDH and DMDH. The relationship between
them is similar to the relationship among DL,
CDH, and DDH. That is, if MP can be easily
solved, then CMDH can be easily solved, and
that if one can solve CMDH then one can solve
DMDH as well. But how to prove the converses is
still an open problem. In particular, the practical
hardness of CMDH and DMDH deserves a focused
discussion of its own.
(2) A new MPKC signature scheme is left to study
because we do not yet have such a scheme based
on our new approach yet.
(3) The new technique of commuting matrices over
a finite field is worth of deep study, for the key
generation. To support our ideas, we briefly adopt
the matrix polynomial method for commuting; but
the key space seems to be a bit too small.
(4) We may try to increase the length of a plaintext
block for reducing the message expansion. For
example, perhaps we could directly remove
the hash function HW
! f0; 1g` from our
encryption scheme in Section 3.2, where
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message M is encoded in an MQ function in
.n; m; Fq /. Then the message expansion is
only double that of ElGamal. In brief, on the basis
of the higher security offered by our scheme, how
to reduce the message expansion deserves more
attention.
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